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CONTRACT SPORTS
MARTHA M. ERTMAN1
This symposium issue on Re-Orienting Law and Sexuality explores the topic in
innovative ways, mining commonalities among sex work, sexual orientation
marginalization, and sexual speech. My work fits into this discussion in that I
explore ways that the private law of commerce can be imported to the private law of
domestic relations to remedy family law’s inadequacy and inequality. Existing
domestic relations law posits heterosexual marriage as naturally superior to other
forms of intimate affiliation, rendering the others (such as cohabitation, same-sex
sexuality, and polyamory) unnatural and inferior. As such, it fails to recognize many
intimate affiliations.2
Two examples of bridging the divide between private business law and private
family law that I discuss in this essay are cohabitation contracts and Premarital
Security Agreements. Cohabitation contracts use contract doctrine to recognize
relationships that judges otherwise would likely ignore or vilify. Premarital Security
Agreements (PSAs) are the centerpiece of my proposal for importing the debtorcreditor law of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code to marriage doctrine. As
described below, I have contended that primary homemakers extend credit to their
primary wage-earning spouses, and that they therefore should be seen as creditors,
and thus able to exercise creditor rights such as the self-help right of repossession
enjoyed by secured creditors.3 This work is part of an antisubordination literature
that includes feminist legal theory, critical race theory, and queer legal theory. It
builds on those theories’ contributions by questioning their conventional focus on
public law, instead asking what tools private law offers to counter subordination.
What follows is a lightly edited text of my remarks at the conference, sketching
the contours of a case for private business law’s potential to help us reimagine the
legal construct of family. Because contract is the metaphor underlying all business
models, and because, as I shall shortly explain, I think that the music played at
sporting events sets an appropriate tone of discussion regarding the contest over

1
Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law. Thanks to Tayyab Mahmud
and Ratna Kapur for organizing a stellar conference and inviting me to join, to the conference
participants for their incisive comments on my presentation, and to Julie Nice for her helpful
comments on this essay.
2
One example of the changing demographics of intimate affiliation is the fact that fully
one third of births in the U.S. each year are to unmarried mothers. Tamar Lewin, Fears for
Children’s Well-Being Complicate Debate Over Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2000. For
further discussion of the patchwork of legal doctrines governing various affiliations, see
Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV.
CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIB. L. REV. 79 (2001).
3
Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work
Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998). The “special rights”
enjoyed by Article 9 secured creditors can be analogized to the special rights for gay people
that Karen Engle ably defends in this symposium. Karen Engle, Legislating Special Rights, 48
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 43 (2000).
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whose intimate affiliations count as “family,” my approach can be aptly described as
contract sports.
As our topic today is reorienting law and sexuality, it seems that we really need a
new theme song. Those who have been “out” for a few years have doubtless noticed
that one song is played at every parade, march, party, and other gay event: Sister
Sledge’s song We Are Family.4 This song suggests that same sex couples can create
legitimate families. Its perennial popularity reflects the gay community’s efforts to
win social legitimacy as families. This goal could be achieved in two ways, either by
successfully arguing that gay families are as natural as heterosexual ones, or by
attacking the very idea that some families are natural while others are unnatural.5 I
have noticed in the panels today a theme of denaturalizing the family as a part of
reorienting law and sexuality. In that same vein I would like to suggest that we pick
a new theme song to accompany the efforts of sexually marginalized people to
denaturalize the family. The song I suggest is Queen’s We Are the Champions.6
As a song played at virtually every sporting event graced by a sound system, We
Are the Champions is familiar to everyone. Another benefit is that the very title
suggests an offensive rather than defensive posture, declaring victory rather than
arguing for inclusion. Rather than asserting a right to inclusion in the family as it
stands, an add-and-stir approach suggesting that legal recognition of same-sex
relationships will not significantly alter the family, the song recognizes an
adversarial posture towards a legal system that is fundamentally hostile to our very
humanity, challenging us to fashion some sort of new regime that includes gay
people and other marginalized groups. Moreover, the group’s name, Queen,
suggests affiliation with the gay community. The fact that a group of men who call
themselves Queen sing this extraordinarily butch song (“we are the champions/ no
time for losers/ we are the champions of the world”),7 which is played in the
extraordinarily butch environment of athletic contests, references the contingency of
gender identity by aligning nellie queens with brute physical strength. Imagine
crowing at a gay pride march, “we are the champions, no time for losers, we are the
champions of the world.”
If We are the Champions is adopted as the new gay theme song, two questions
must be addressed: who are “we,” and what does it mean to be a champion. One
way to answer these questions is by adopting a “queer” posture. Queer is a postmodern term of art adopted by queer theorists.8 Related to, but separate from the

4

Sister Sledge, We are Family, MILLENNIUM DISCO PARTY (2000).

5
The second approach challenges the naturalized model of family to suggest that it should
be replaced by some other model, such as a functionalist model that recognizes various
intimate affiliations based on the needs of the participants rather than a judgment that some
relationships, deemed natural, get premiere rights and responsibilities, while others, deemed
unnatural or less natural, receive either obloquy or lesser rights and responsibilities than the
relationships deemed natural. This essay focuses on this approach. For further discussion, see
Ertman, supra note 2.
6

Queen, We Are the Champions, QUEEN’S GREATEST HITS (1992).

7

Id.

8

Lisa Duggan, Making It Perfectly Queer, in SEX WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL
CULTURE 155 (Lisa Duggan and Nan Hunter eds., 1995).
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term gay, the term queer affects a significant theoretical change that explicitly rejects
the relevance of conduct and status in determining identity. Just as orange juice is no
longer only for breakfast, as Anita Bryant said in the 1970s, queer sexual orientation
is no longer only for those who engage in (or desire to engage in) same-sex
sexuality.
According to queer theory, the delineations between gay and straight are
fundamentally contingent: people come and go from each category during their
lives, and membership can be determined by a number of potentially conflicting
criteria, including conduct, desire and non-conformity to conventional gender roles.
Thus, being queer is not based on what you do, nor is it based on how you were born.
What defines a person as queer is what she or he believes. If one believes that
subordination is bad, if one opposes homophobia, if one opposes racism, if one
opposes sexism, then one is queer. I am not alone in defining a sexual orientation
based on epistemological opposition to subordination.9 At the end of the movie In
and Out10 the high school teacher played by Kevin Kline might lose his job because
he comes out as gay. The defining moment is when one by one, all of his friends,
students, and colleagues, proclaim that they are also gay. One can read this moment
in the film as the osmosis of high theory into popular culture. We know that many or
most of the characters who come out as gay in order to defend the gay teacher are
involved in or desire only opposite-sex sexual contact. But they are not coming out
as people who desire or engage in same-sex contact. Instead, they come out as
opponents to subordination on the basis of marginalized sexuality, making the
marginalized position majoritarian merely by altering the definition of gay from
conduct or status to belief.
Under this theory, the queers are those who oppose subordination. Building on
the insights of critical legal studies, critical race theory, and feminist legal theory,
queer legal theory seeks to intervene in subordination on the basis of sex, gender,
race, class and sexual orientation. If “we are the champions,” queer is one way to
understand who “we” are.
The next question turns on the issue of champions. Those of us opposed to
subordination might feel uncomfortable trumpeting “we are the champions, no time
for losers, we are the champions of the world,”11 as this declaration seems
inconsistent with equality. Few anti-subordination advocates would want to divide
the world into champions and losers. I would like to suggest, however, that there
might exist something akin to an anti-subordination champion. We could build on
our re-definition of marginalized sexuality as queer rather than gay, and visualize an
outcome in which “being a champion” means to champion anti-subordination.
With a new theme song and sense of our task, the question remains on how
society is to attain this goal. Post-structuralism teaches that multiple ways exist to
tackle particular problems, and progressive movements include a tremendous
diversity of good faith anti-subordination perspectives.12
Rejecting this
9

See, e.g., Michael Warner, Introduction, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS
Warner ed., 1993).

AND SOCIAL THEORY (Michael
10

In and Out (Paramount Pictures, 1997).

11

Queen, supra note 6.

12

See, e.g., Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 99
U. CHI. L. FORUM 21, 46-48 (1999) (describing various strands of feminism).
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methodological multiplicity results in an essentialism that will not hold up under
scrutiny. Michael Warner suggests in his recent book that Hawaii’s reciprocal
beneficiaries legislation, providing many of the benefits of marriage (though not all
of them by a long shot) is a “politically brokered compromise” and a dangerous form
of second class citizenship.13 I suspect that Warner’s view is too narrow. Reciprocal
beneficiaries legislation allows same sex couples, and other couples who are barred
from marrying, to engage in some partnership-related activities, recognized and
validated by state law.14 The movement to broaden the range of state-recognized
intimate affiliations requires that advocates seek both marriage and alternatives to
marriage (such as civil unions in Vermont, reciprocal beneficiary relationships in
Hawaii, and domestic partnership protections in other jurisdictions). These
alternative claims complement rather than compete with one another: if the Hawaii
Supreme Court had not been on the verge of recognizing same-sex marriage, then the
Hawaii legislature would not have responded by enacting what was at the time the
broadest set of rights and responsibilities accorded to same-sex couples in the U.S.15
Moreover, a legal regime that recognizes only marriage (opposite-sex and same-sex)
remains subordinating to the extent that it ignores non-marital intimate affiliations
and normalizes those who do enter into marriage.16 The optimal system would
instead recognize a range of intimate affiliations, including marriage, but not
preferencing it as morally, religiously or naturally superior.17 Recognizing reciprocal
beneficiaries alongside domestic partnerships, civil unions, and marriage is
consistent with this larger goal. In other words, multiple modes of legal claims can
co-exist and need not be compared along zero-sum lines. Among the array of legal
claims are the ones that mine private law to reconstruct our understandings of
intimate affiliation.
The two examples of re-structuring the legal regulation of intimate affiliations
that I will address here may seem retrograde or assimilationist. However, there is an
argument to be made that they are also interventions in conventional ways of seeing
both problems and solutions. Specifically, privatized understandings of intimate
13

MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS AND THE ETHICS OF
QUEER LIFE 126 (1999). The same arguments can be made regarding Vermont’s civil unions, a
parallel status to marriage that is available only to same-sex couples.
14

In Hawaii reciprocal beneficiaries must be barred from marrying, so same sex couples
can be reciprocal beneficiaries. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572-1 to 572–7 (Supp. 1999). In
Vermont, in contrast, reciprocal beneficiaries must be barred from both marriage and civil
uions so that same-sex romantic couples cannot be reciprocal beneficiaries in Vermont. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (Supp. 2000).
15
Susan Essoyan, Hawaii Approves Benefits Package for Gay Couples, L.A. TIMES, April
20, 1997, at A3.
16

See Nancy Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian
Marriage Will Not ‘Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,’ 79 VA. L.
REV. 1535 (1993); Paula Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family
Recognition, 5 J. L. & POL’Y. 107 (1996); Janet E. Halley, Recognition, Rights, Normalization,
Regulation: Rhetorics of Justification in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in LEGAL
RECOGINTION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2000).
17

Ertman, supra note 2.
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affiliation contribute to the denaturalization of the conventional heterosexual family,
making it possible to recognize same-sex and other marginalized affiliations. I will
describe two examples. The first relates to same-sex cohabitation contracts, and the
second proposes importing debtor-creditor law to the law governing heterosexual
marriage.
First, same-sex cohabitation contracts. It is consistent with the current direction
of doctrine and theory regarding same-sex sexuality to mine the emancipatory
potential of relationship contracts. In 1992, the Georgia Supreme Court enforced a
cohabitation contract between two lesbians, named Crooke and Gilden respectively.18
Gilden sought specific performance of their written relationship contract, which
contained a merger clause. A merger clause provides that the writing represents the
complete agreement of the parties, and that evidence from outside the writing is not
admissible to determine the meaning of the agreement.19 Gilden came to court
saying: we have a writing, it contains a merger clause, please enforce it. Crooke
tried to prevent the court from enforcing the agreement, arguing that the agreement
was unenforceable as it was supported by illicit and immoral consideration. The
Georgia Supreme Court rejected Crooke’s argument. It invoked the parol evidence
rule, which is the legal equivalent of putting on blinders, relying on the merger
clause to conclude that the court can only look at the writing and not at any extrinsic
evidence.20 It refused, in other words, to consider whether the relationship
agreement between two female romantic partners was supported by illicit and
immoral consideration. As a result, the Georgia Supreme Court enforced the samesex relationship contract.21
Similarly, in Posik v. Layton, the Florida Court of Appeals enforced a same-sex
cohabitation contract.22 Just as the Georgia Supreme Court invoked the classical
contract doctrine of parol evidence, the Florida court invoked the liberal ideal of
freedom of contract to enforce the cohabitation agreement.23 While Crooke v. Gilden
was decided in the shadow of Bowers v. Hardwick,24 Posik v. Layton was decided in
the shadow of Florida’s affirmative bans on same-sex marriage and adoption by gay
people.25 The Posik court used freedom of contract rhetoric to navigate around the
shadow of the anti-gay law:
Even though the agreement was couched in terms of a personal services
contract, it was intended to be much more. It was a nuptial agreement
18

Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).

19

JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIF. COMMERICAL CODE 103-4 (5th ed. 2000).

20

Crooke, 414 S.E.2d at 646. It further reasoned that even if the parol evidence was
relevant, the sexual element of the relationship between Crooke and Gilden was “incidental to
the contract rather than required by it.” Id.
21

Id.

22

695 So.2d 759 (Fla. App. 1997), review denied, 699 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1997).

23

Id. at 761.

24

478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia’s criminal sodomy statute as applied to people
engaged in same-sex activity).
25

Posik v. Layton, 695 So.2d 759, 761 (1997), review denied, 699 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1997).
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entered into by two parties that the State prohibits from marrying. But
even though the State has prevented same-sex marriages and same-sex
adoptions it has not prohibited this type of agreement. By prohibiting
same-sex marriages, the State has merely denied homosexuals the rights
granted to married partners that flow naturally from the marital
relationship. . . . But the State has not denied those individuals their right
to either will their property as they see fit nor to privately commit by
contract to spend their money as they choose. The State is not thusly
condoning the lifestyles of homosexuals or unmarried live-ins, it is merely
recognizing their constitutional private property and contract rights.26
This language suggests that contract law may provide an under-explored mechanism
whereby marginalized people, here gay people, can obtain some rights (and incur
responsibilities) that they might not otherwise.
While contract doctrine, such as the parol evidence rule, allows the court to
recognize same-sex relationship contracts, it also presents unmistakable dangers.
Crooke encourages same-sex couples to be quiet about their personal lives and about
their sexuality in particular.27 If the writing between Crooke and Gilden had
included reference to their relationship such as a recitation of their reason for
entering the agreement (by referencing the exchange of services of a “lover,
companion, homemaker, travelling companion, housekeeper and cook”),28 the court
might have refused to enforce the agreement, reasoning that the agreement’s
“rendition of sex and other services naturally flowing from sexual cohabitation was
an inseparable part of the consideration for the so-called cohabitation agreement.”29
The parol evidence rule merely excludes extrinsic evidence, not evidence in the
writing itself. Moreover, power disparities within relationships may jeopardize free
choice in entering the agreement. These are important questions for people who are
concerned with power imbalances. However, as a practical matter Gilden got more
than she would have without asserting her rights under the cohabitation contract.
She enjoyed specific performance, and at least some legal visibility. The judges had
to look at her as a legal subject and citizen.
In prior work I have argued that the ability to contract can be part of what
constructs one as a legal person.30 In the Nineteenth Century and beforehand, white
women and African-American men and women were legally defined in part by their
inability to enter binding contracts.31 Those doctrines changed with the advent of the

26

Id.

27

Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, But
Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107 (1996).
28

Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Ct. App. 1981) (refusing to enforce a same-sex
relationship contract on the grounds that its reference to the relationship of the parties as
lovers made it a meretricious contract).
29

Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 410 (Ct. App. 1988) (distinguishing Jones v.
Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Ct. App. 1981)).
30

Ertman, supra note 27, at 1162-64.

31

Id. at 1163.
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Married Women’s Property Acts and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.32 In a nutshell, the Married
Women’s Property Acts provided that married women have the right to contract and
own property.33 Similarly, § 1981 provided that “all persons . . . shall have the same
right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”34 As
with the cohabitation contract cases, contract here presents a double-edged sword
presupposing control over property and equality of bargaining power. However
some of the problems of inequality inherent in contract may be addressed by
accounting for the ways that law and society influence each other. The intermediate
step of recognizing gay people’s contractual rights could set the stage for a more full
exercise of rights.35
One final benefit of contract analysis is related to issues of moral rhetoric. Gay
and other marginalized people tend to suffer moral condemnation because of their
marginal (and often minority) status. Majoritarian morality is one of the primary
impediments to equality for sexual minorities. Majoritarian morality often supports
traditional family values, defining heterosexual marriage as legitimate because of its
difference from non-heterosexual, non-marital arrangements. Contract theory and
doctrine offer a respite from majoritian and moral views. Same sex couples, for
example, can contract for rights and responsibilities that they cannot get from a
legislature that is held hostage to majoritarian morality. In sum, contractual analysis
of same sex relationships is both a practical solution to the marginalization of most
gay couples and a theoretical foundation for constructing gay personhood.
Having explored how contract doctrine can facilitate legal visibility for same-sex
couples, I now turn to focus on the heterosexual family. My second example of how
private law mechanisms can reconstruct the family proposes importing debtorcreditor law to family law to redistribute power and assets within the heterosexual
family. In an article titled Commercializing Marriage,36 I proposed importing
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 to domestic relations law as a means to
reimburse primary homemakers for their contributions to family wealth.37 Article 9
of the UCC governs the relationship between a debtor and a creditor when the
creditor takes an interest in collateral to secure payment of a debt or performance of
an obligation.38 My proposal provides a way to recognize the ways in which primary
wage earners owe a debt to their primary homemaking spouses. Specifically,
primary homemakers contribute to primary wager-earners’ earning potential when

32

Id. at 1163-64.

33
For an excellent discussion of the evolution of married women’s property acts, see Reva
B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings,
1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994).
34

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).

35

For an argument for the progressive potential of recognizing marginalized people’s
ability to engage in market relationships, which she calls “economic personality,” as distinct
from “political personality,” see Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An
Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 242 (1999).
36

Ertman, supra note 3.

37

Id.; U.C.C. § 9-101 et seq. (1990).

38

U.C.C. §§ 9-102; 1-201(37) (1990).
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they perform homemaking services and forego opportunities to develop their own
earning potential. To recognize this debt and provide a self-help remedy if the
primary wage-earner does not repay it by sharing his income with his primary
homemaking spouse (i.e., if the couple divorces), I suggest that the couple execute
what I call a Premarital Security Agreement (PSA) at the outset of the marriage. In
the PSA, the spouses agree that if a debt arises during the marriage through the
primary homemaker’s contributions to family wealth, the primary wage-earner must
repay that debt to the primary homemaker. This model gives the socially weak
primary homemaker a very powerful socio-economic role as an Article 9 secured
creditor.39 Those familiar with Article 9 know that being a secured creditor is a
powerful advantage, in large part because you get repossession rights. If the debtor
refuses to pay, you can seize the collateral, and either keep it or sell it to pay off the
debt.40 The private industry of “repo people,” hired by homemakers, out seizing
computers and cars and other collateral owned by primary wage-earners, could
destablize marriage as a hierarchical institution.
It may seem strange to talk about heterosexual marriage when this conference has
focused on same-sex sexuality. Why should gay people care about the plight of
displaced homemakers? I suggest that queers should be concerned about the noncommodification of homemaking labor. Not just to be friendly, not even to be
liberal, but in fact because the definition of queer demands we pay attention to
gender subordination generally, not just in the context of same-sex sexuality. The redefinition of queer posits that identity is socially constructed, and that identity
constructions can change in ways that alleviate subordination.41 According to queer
theory (along with postmodern theory and much of feminist theory), sex, race,
gender and sexual orientation are not natural, but rather social artifacts.42 These
identity categories are not transhistorical, but instead change in various contexts. For
example, sex could be determined by a lot of things. It could be determined by your
genitalia, by your chromosomes, by your identity (what you choose to call yourself),
or by secondary sexual characteristics. Clearly some people change their sex, or do
not neatly fit into the category man or women. Thus we see that sex is not essential,
is not biological, is not inevitable.43 Social judgment rather than biological fact,
declares that a person is male or female.
Similarly, race is socially constructed. At various times race has been
determined in different ways. Until recently, the U.S. Census did not ask people to
identify their race. The census taker instead looked at a person and made a racial

39

Ertman, supra note 3, at 94-95.

40

U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to 9-505 (1990).

41

Martha M. Ertman, Oscar Wilde: Paradoxical Poster Child for Both Identity and PostIdentity, 25 L. & SOC. INQ. 153 (2000).
42

Id. at 169-71.

43

See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (1999) (holding that a transsexual woman is
biologically male). Two sexes do not exhaust the possibilities. As one commentator
explained, “I am biologically female but don’t identify as a woman. I look like a man but am
not a man. The most suitable word to describe me is transgendered.” Jennifer Levi &
Shannon Minter, Female to Male, Nine to Five, GIRLFRIENDS, June 2000, at 10 (quoting
Jennifer Levi, a “trans-identified lesbian”).
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classification based on appearance (i.e., skin color or facial features).44 Over time
the Census gradually evolved toward asking people to determine their own race.
Along the line, multi-racial people were classified differently at different times.
Sometimes race turned on the father’s race, sometimes on the race of the non-white
parent, and still other times on the mother’s race.45 The changing methods of
determining race demonstrate that it is a social construction rather than biological
fact.
Sexual orientation is also socially constructed. It can be based on identity (what
one calls oneself), desire (past or current), activity (past or present), or gender
performance. Particular situations highlight the difficulty of any particular method
of determining sexual orientation. Are female cohabitants who were once lovers but
have not had sex in years still lesbians? If they are sexual, but do not call themselves
lesbians, are they gay? What is the sexual orientation of a heterosexually married
woman who desires same-sex sexual contact but does not act on that desire? How
about a woman who identifies as gay but desires sexual contact with men? What if
she has had most sexual experiences with men, but now is sexual with a woman?
How about a woman who has been heterosexually married for years, but has affairs
with women? What if a woman is romantically involved with a male-to-female
transsexual? The judgment calls required to answer these questions reveal that
sexual orientation, like gender and race, is socially constructed rather than grounded
in biological fact.
One danger of focusing on the social construction of identity is that society tends
to focus on marked, marginalized identities. We talk about the contingency of
African-American identity, not whiteness. We talk about the contingency of gay and
lesbian categories, not heterosexuality. This pattern is dangerous, as it leaves the
unmarked category (whiteness, heterosexuality, maleness) unchallenged in its
naturalized status. As Dorothy Allison and Esther Newton urged, it is imperative to
deconstruct heterosexuality first.46 One effective way to deconstruct heterosexuality
(in other words, to denaturalize the heterosexual family) is to intervene in its legal
construction. Every proposal to destabilize the construction of the family as natural,
biological or inevitable implicitly furthers this project.
Commercializing marriage and contractualizing intimate affiliation generally are
ways to destabilize the construction of one form of intimate affiliation (“the family”)
as natural, biological, or inevitable. Commercializing marriage, in particular,
denaturalizes the family in at least four ways. It could contribute to destabilizing
compulsory heterosexuality, demonstrate the performativity of gender and sexual
orientation, queer the state, and pave the road for state recognition of same-sex
relationships.
If queers sign on to projects such as alleviating the plight of displaced
homemakers, doing so could also benefit gay people by denaturalizing the family.
We have quite a long way to go in dismantling what Adrienne Rich famously called

44
U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2 (1959); U.S.
Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 3 (1971); U.S. Department
of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States B-2 (1980).
45

Id.

46

Lisa Duggan, supra note 8, at 179, 185.
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compulsory heterosexuality.47 By increasing financial power for women in
heterosexual relationships, commercializing marriage creates exit options for
women. Providing a way out is undoubtedly consistent with queer theory and
political goals.
A second way that private law imports to domestic relations law denaturalize
family is that contractual models of intimacy demonstrate the performative nature of
gender. Judith Butler has insightfully written about the social construction of
gender, arguing that it is not real, true or biological, but rather a performance.48 She
uses the example of drag queens to illustrate that there is nothing real about sex or
gender. A man in a dress shows that gender is a performance, revealing that women
in dresses similarly perform gender. Even claims that gender is natural reveal the
contingency of gender. When Aretha Franklin sings “You Make Me Feel Like a
Natural Woman”49 the operative term is like, suggesting that Aretha declares that she
can only impersonate the real thing, because there is no such a thing as a natural
woman – only the idea that gender is natural.50 Just listing a few of the activities that
many women engage in each morning to prepare to face the world, such as styling
hair, shaving legs and underarms, plucking eyebrows, and bleaching mustaches,
demonstrates that there is no such thing as a natural woman.51 As Simone de
Beauvoir famously stated, “one is not born a woman, but rather becomes one.”52
A third reason to champion private law interventions into domestic relations law
is that doing so has the potential to queer the state. Lisa Duggan has pointed out that
queer theory and activism, which is really what this symposium explores, often seem
to be headed in opposite directions.53 She suggests that activism and theory should
be both transformative and effective; we need to be both liberational and
subversive.54 Just seeking same-sex marriage all by itself is only going to be
47
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liberational, it is only going to get some gay people goodies. It seems unlikely to
intervene in fundamental hierarchies that elevate some of us as morally or naturally
superior to others, and it may not significantly denaturalize the family. Even gay
marriage could leave intact the presumption that some kinds of relationships are
natural and/or moral thereby deserve legal protection and support while others are
stigmatized as unnatural.
Doctrinal interventions should therefore be both
liberational and transformative. PSAs have the potential to be both. They liberate
primary homemakers from the indigency associated with the non-commodification
of their contributions to family wealth. They are transformative, showing that the
role of primary homemaker and primary wage-earner are performative, that anybody
could do them.55 It could be someone with breasts and a vagina. It also could be
somebody with a penis. That very redefinition of a primary homemaker, into
someone who has the market characteristics of a secured creditor, powerfully
changes family as we currently understand it.
Fourth and finally, importing private law to the law governing intimate
affiliations could facilitate state recognition of same-sex relationships. The primary
barrier to that recognition is hostility to relationships that are deemed unnatural. As
long as the only kinds of relationships recognized by the state are those comprised of
one man and one woman, who can engage in penile-vaginal penetration,56 the state
cannot recognize same-sex relationships. There is a myth that this heterosexual dyad
is the only kind of real family. Yet this “real family” represents only a fraction of
the population; fully thirty percent of American households are “non family,”
meaning that people live alone or with non-relatives.57 If we commercialize
marriage and contractualize relationships that are often understood as natural, we
might over time see intimate affiliation as not necessarily a matter of engaging in
natural or unnatural acts, but instead of engaging in agreements about exchanging
resources (financial, emotional, social, physical). Under this analysis, legal
regulation is functional rather than judgmental. If a consensual adult intimate
affiliation exists, the state would not have to shy away from recognizing it on
grounds that some religions deem it unnatural.
In conclusion, this panel is about making progress in obtaining benefits for
people who are marginalized by law and by society. To paraphrase Catharine
MacKinnon, law is not everything, but it’s not nothing either.58 It can be used in a
lot of creative ways. Specifically, importing private business models to domestic
relations law has the potential to contribute to a reconstruction of law and sexuality
to recognize that we can all be champions. At a minimum, a focus on contract sports
offers models in which many more of us win than the current, naturalized, model of
family.
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